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“Well, no offence, but I don’t really think adults listen to us and they just want to 
think what they think, especially if the kid is younger. And I think the kids should 
be listened to as well as adults. I think they should be treated the way an adult is 
treated and be allowed to have their say.”1 
 
I. Introduction 
Institutional design in the modern state increasingly incorporates features from both 
adversarial and inquisitorial models indicating considerable convergence.
2
 This chapter 
examines the hybrid model provided by British Columbia’s Representative for Children 
and Youth (RCY) and argues that the RCY offers important institutional insights 
regarding the effectiveness of these types of investigative bodies found across Canada as 
well as internationally. The paper also examines the evolution of procedural justice in this 
substantive policy area. I will argue that the hybrid mode—at least with respect to 
children—illustrates how procedural fairness serves substantive rights. To show this, the 
paper does not engage in the substantive areas of family, health, education welfare or 
                                                        
1
 The quote is taken from an interview with a child found in the Report of the Columbus Pilot study of case 
management and the adversarial family law system by the Family Court of Western Australia. See Lisbeth 
T. Pike and Paul T. Murphy, “Invisible Parties: Listening to Children—A Social Science Perspective,” 
Paper presented at the Australian Family Law Conference, 24 October 2006, 1 at 12. Available at: 
http://www.familycourt.wa.gov.au/_files/FLC%20Paper%20Oct06.pdf.  
2
 Voluminous discussion regarding the precise meaning of the words ‘adversarial’ and ‘inquisitorial’ exists. 
For the purposes of this paper, I will maintain the common law understanding of adversarial and use 
inquisitorial in the more open-ended sense of an investigative model not premised on bipolar relations with 
an active public official at the head. On the key differences between adversarial and inquisitorial processes, 
see Laverne Jacob’s paper “Building on the Ombudsman: Polyjuralism and Dispute Resolution in the 
Canadian Access to Information Context” in this volume. For discussion of the adversarial-non adversarial 
debate, see Chapter 2 in Australian Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper 62 Review of the federal 
civil justice system, Sydney 1999 (Available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/dp/62/); A. Jolowicz, Adversarial and Inquisitorial 
Models of Civil Procedure,” (2003) 52:2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 281-295; and Arie 
Freiberg, “Post-Adversarial and Post-Inquisitorial Justice: Transcending Traditional Penological 
Paradigms,” (2010). Monash University Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010/17. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1609468. 
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criminal policy and their accompanying areas of law but, rather, how the institutional 
shift to a hybrid model indicates a kind of praxis in which the institution powers and 
functions as well as the rights of the vulnerable persons they affect have broadened and 
deepened. This enlargement of capacity is reciprocal, having been driven by internal 
domestic legal reform, changes in attitudes and norms with respect to children’s 
autonomy, rights and dignity, and the increasingly direct influence of international norms 
such as those found in Articles 3
3
 and 12
4
 of the 1990 United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC).
5
 
 
                                                        
3
 Article 3 provides that:  
 
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child 
shall be a primary consideration. 
 
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her 
well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other 
individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and 
administrative measures. 
 
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or 
protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, 
particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as 
competent supervision. 
 
4
 Article 12 provides that:  
 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to 
express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial 
and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an 
appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. 
 
5
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3. Canada signed the Convention in 1990. 
Parliament and nearly all of the provinces initially approved and the CRC was ratified in 1991. Alberta, 
which later endorsed the Convention in 1999, did not support the CRC because it argued that the rights 
contained in the document undermined parental authority. The CRC has not been automatically 
incorporated into domestic legislation due to Canada’s federal structure. Nevertheless, Canada is obliged to 
conform, the Convention can indirectly influence policy and laws, and some provinces have taken steps to 
implement or incorporate the principles in specific statutes.  
Mary Liston Evolving Capacities: BCRCY as a Hybrid Model of Oversight  5
Before examining the development and features of the Office of the Representative for 
Children and Youth, the chapter will first provide an attenuated history of the 
governance of children and earlier institutional models of state protection of child 
welfare. The BCRCY will be contrasted with these earlier models in section III to 
show its hybrid nature as well as its institutional strengths and vulnerabilities. The 
final section will then consider the BCRCY in an international context in order to 
situate it comparatively amongst other countries’ children’s representatives. A 
comparative angle discloses that the general trend in Western countries has been to 
create independent and stand-alone bodies, such as the BCRCY, with a specialized 
focus on children. 
 
II. A Short Evolutionary Story  
In order to see how the creation of the BCRCY marks a significant change to traditional 
approaches to child welfare and the accompanying institutional architecture, I will first 
provide a short genealogy encapsulating the historical development of different 
approaches to children’s rights as well as norm change regarding children’s rights in 
Western societies. 
 
a. From Victorian Mores to Social Welfare 
Child welfare has been a government responsibility in British Columbia since 1919. As 
with many jurisdictions at that time, a public official or single bureau was charged with 
protecting neglected or otherwise vulnerable children only when parents were deemed 
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incapable or negligent.
6
 The accompanying policy framework relegated responsibility for 
children to the private sphere for care unless they were abandoned, significantly 
endangered, neglected, or impoverished. Churches provided the civil society complement 
to state care. Family matters not resolved in the private sphere, depending on family 
resources, entered the legal system only in extreme cases of child abuse, children’s death, 
or divorce. As passive, voiceless objects of parental or state control, children were neither 
seen nor heard.  
 
The alternately paternalistic and laissez-faire Victorian model shifted with the 
development of the welfare state. Charged with multiple responsibilities for child welfare 
and embracing a new human rights culture, post-World War II states initiated a slew of 
reforms aimed at children in general as well as children-at-risk due to challenges posed 
by their families or particular religious or cultural communities. In most Western 
countries, humanitarian concerns, principles of compassion and benevolence, and the 
sentimentalization of childhood provided the ethical motivation for the development of 
modern institutions of child welfare.
7
 As Viviana Zelizer persuasively argues, American 
culture shifted—morally, economically, and politically—to view children as 
economically ‘useless,’ but morally priceless.8 Children’s representation and participation 
                                                        
6
 For specific treatment of the early history of child welfare in British Columbia, see Christopher Walmsley 
and Diane Purvey, eds., Child and Family Welfare in British Columbia: A History (Calgary: Detselig 
Enterprises, 2005). See also R. Brian Howe, “Implementing children’s rights in a federal state: The case of 
Canada’s child protection system,” (2001) 9 International Journal of Children’s Rights 361 at 362-63. 
7
 For an overview of this history, see the “Introduction,” in Mona Gleason et al, eds., Lost Kids: Vulnerable 
Children and Youth in Twentieth-Century Canada and the United States (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 1-
12. For a similar history, but one that draws out the implications for the treatment of the child as a legal 
subject, see Daiva Stasiulis, “The Active Child Citizen: Lessons from Canadian Policy and the Children’s 
Movement,” (2002) 6:4 Citizenship Studies, 507-38. 
8
 Viviana Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children (New York: Basic 
Books, 1985). Risks to children, historically minimized by adults, became a cause for collective concern 
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in the justice system, however, did not shift as radically from the original common law 
legal baseline where they were designated chattels or property. They remained 
disadvantaged by adversarial legal processes premised on adult norms and persons that 
did not treat them as full legal persons who could claim rights along with the fulfilment 
of duties. Indeed, children were generally considered incompetent, incapacitated and 
dependent.
9
 
 
b. The Unadulterated Adversarial Model: Lawyer Advocates 
Lawyers traditionally acted on behalf of children when welfare, protection and family 
cases entered the court system. For common law jurisdictions, the earliest model was a 
court-appointed lawyer or guardian ad litem who represented a child in wardship, 
guardianship, child protection, and access and custody cases. Studies from Australia, 
New Zealand and the United States that have analyzed the effectiveness of lawyer 
advocates in representing children convey enormous dissatisfaction with this model from 
many participating actors.
10
 Systemic criticisms condemned how a common law system 
treated children as passive and inferior legal subjects, and emphasized how lawyers failed 
to listen properly to familial concerns, treat children with respect, and properly solicit 
their views. The studies disclosed that lawyers often did not speak to or physically meet 
with the children they were charged with representing. Moreover, though lawyers were 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and a measure of the advancement of society in the American Progressive Era (roughly 1896 to 1920). 
Zelizer discusses the broad cultural shift whereby adults expressed empathic commitments to children 
though modern education, health, insurance, and labour policies and programs. 
9
 For a pithy summation of these problems, see J.M. Herlihy, “Dealing with Child Abuse: Adversarial 
versus Investigative Systems,” (1992) 24:1 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, 16-22. Herlihy focuses 
on the historically recurring problems in child abuse cases in which children could be compelled to give 
evidence. See also Alison Cleland, “Legal Solutions for Children: Comparing Scots Law with Other 
Jurisdictions,” (1995) 10 Scottish Affairs, 6-14. 
10
 See Andy Bilson and Sue White, “Representing Children’s Views and Best Interests in Court: An 
International Comparison,” (2005) 14 Child Abuse Review 220 at 230-31. 
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considered generally effective advocates in courts, they were shown to lack the expertise 
and focus that individuals solely devoted to considering children’s interests and 
representing their wishes possess. In many cases, a clear tension existed between the role 
of the lawyer who was simultaneously acting for the court while also serving children’s 
interests. With busy practices and large caseloads, lawyer advocates often lacked the time 
and energy to provide supports to children who experienced trauma and bewilderment in 
the court system because they were placed in adversarial relations with family members 
and/or governmental agencies. Studies measuring children’s satisfaction with models of 
representation rank lawyer-only systems poorly.
11
 Failing to act comprehensively and 
compassionately and playing only short-term, temporary roles in children’s lives, the 
lawyer-advocate model was shown to fall quite short.
12
  
 
The extension of legal rights to children and the statutory direction for legal actors to 
consider the best interests of the child in decision have not constituted an adequate 
remedy for the deficiencies of the adversarial model.
13
 One critic of the adversarial 
system maintains that for the adversarial system to become more flexible and meet the 
needs of children would “involve a change of such magnitude that it could weaken the 
very fabric…”.14 A fundamental overhaul with the adversarial system appears to be a 
non-starter, but the institutional consequence of this reality has been non-uniform 
incremental attempts at reform across a number of jurisdictions. Adversarial legal 
                                                        
11
 Ibid. at 235. 
12
 For further discussion on this point, please see the contribution to this volume by Jula Hughes which 
examines the challenges for traumatized victims testifying in adversarial systems. 
13
 For a vigorous critique of how the best interests principle has been interpreted and applied by judges in 
custody decision in the legal system, see Cindy L. Baldassi, Susan B. Boyd and Fiona Kelly, “Losing the 
Child in Child-Centred Legal Processes,” in Lost Kids, supra note 7, 192-212. 
14
 Herlihy, supra note 9 at 18. 
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culture remains resistant to change and continues to permeate other models in 
common law countries.15 
 
c. The Adulterated Adversarial Model: State and Volunteer Advocates 
Generalized dissatisfaction with the adversarial system and lawyer-advocates produced a 
slate of alternative models from the 1970s on and which modified the adversarial system 
to make use of investigative methodology and more comprehensive approaches to 
children’s cases. The challenging and multiple needs of children resulted in the creation 
of expert bodies whose primary function was child advocacy or, alternatively, alternative 
dispute resolution processes. The use of these bodies was, until recently, the orthodox 
model in Canada and in other common law jurisdictions. Led by Ontario and Alberta, 
child advocacy offices became a preferred reform choice in Canada.
16
 On the continuum 
of models, the Office of the Child and Youth Advocate (OCYA) in Alberta hearkens 
back to these early efforts to manage child welfare through an independent agency that 
acts as a check and a balance on government decision-making affecting young people and 
is primarily devoted to the amplification of child and youth voices, greater participation, 
and championing for child and youth rights (see Tables 1 and 2).  
                                                        
15
 In an early article, Carrie Menkel-Meadow analyzed the co-opting tendencies of adversarial lawyers—
their attitudes and practices—when participating in alternative dispute resolutions systems. See “Pursuing 
Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted, or ‘The Law of ADR,’” (1991) 19:1 
Florida State University Law Review 1-46. In her contribution to this collection, Robin Creyke discusses 
contemporary difficulties in shaking the adversarial culture within the context of hearings in Australian 
administrative tribunals that have been statutorily designated as “inquisitorial”. See Robin Creyke, 
“Pragmatism v. Policy: Attitude of Australian Courts and Tribunals to Inquisitorial Process”. In the 
Canadian context, see British Columbia Ministry of Attorney General Justice Services Branch, “Legal 
Culture,” 23 February 2005, 1-18. Available at: http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/justice-reform-
initiatives/publications/pdf/LegalCulture.pdf.  
16
 Further information on Ontario’s history and new model can be found in Paul C. Whitehead, Nicholas 
Bala et al., “A New Model for Child and Youth Advocacy in Ontario,” 2004 Report prepared for the 
Ministry of Children and Youth Services. Available at: 
http://provincialadvocate.on.ca/documents/en/Final_Report_Eng.pdf. 
Mary Liston Evolving Capacities: BCRCY as a Hybrid Model of Oversight  10
 
The OCYA functions as a delegate of the provincial Ministry of Children and Youth 
Services. The OCYA is accountable to and receives it funding from the Ministry and is 
therefore neither stand-alone nor independent. Nevertheless, it is expert in its specialized 
focus on children and youth. The OCYA’s core function remains traditional individual 
advocacy for vulnerable children and the investigation of complaints from adults and 
children regarding the provision of government services. It is one step removed from the 
lawyer-advocate model as evidenced by its responsibility for appointing legal counsel 
through its Legal Representation for Children and Youth services. It does not, unlike 
similar bodies in other jurisdictions, investigate children’s deaths (See Table 2). The 
OCYA also does not undertake systemic reform efforts, attesting again to its main role as 
an internal advocacy system.
17
 The primary audience for the Alberta office, then, is the 
Alberta provincial government. 
 
A further step along the continuum brings us to the American model of citizen volunteers 
as guardians ad litem (see Table 3). In this model, state agencies recruit, train, and 
manage volunteer representatives from a variety of backgrounds—social workers, 
lawyers, and ‘ordinary’ citizens—to act as court appointed special advocates. 
Independent representation of abused and neglected children is their chief function, rather 
than legal services, and the shift to trained citizen volunteers reduces costs, especially 
when compared to the cost of using lawyer-advocates. Studies of citizen volunteers 
conclude that this model excelled at providing effective and efficient representation, 
                                                        
17
 Howe speculates that the OCYA differs from other models in Canada—indeed lags—because the more 
conservative and libertarian political culture of Alberta places greater emphasis on the privacy and 
autonomy of the family. Howe, supra note 6 at 362. 
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especially when volunteers work in tandem with lawyers to effectuate the best interests of 
vulnerable children.
18
 Nevertheless, this model is both resource intensive due to the 
constant training of volunteers and exceptional in that perhaps no other country in the 
world embraces a tradition of volunteerism (instead of relying on the state) as the United 
States does. Finally, despite reliance on volunteer advocates in what appears to be a more 
radical system, these child representatives are subject to pressures to professionalize in 
order to best represent children’s interests.19 Voluntary citizen review boards and 
volunteer citizen guardians depend on quality appointments, a requirement which means 
that volunteers may have to undergo training in a variety of complex child development 
and welfare areas, including legal, in order to make competent judgements about a child’s 
best interests.  
 
d. Specialized and Hybrid Ombuds 
Instead of the adulterated adversarial model, a different institutional remedy emerged as a 
common form in Canada: the Ombudsman.
20
 The virtues of the Ombuds model in the 
child welfare context are significant in contrast to the Alberta model discussed above: 
greater independence and autonomy; greater accountability to the public due to the 
connection with the provincial legislature; specialized focus on children and youth; and, 
enhanced efforts at implementing policy recommendations and systemic reform.
21
 These 
                                                        
18
 Bilson and White, supra note 10 at 229. 
19
 For a discussion of several of the strengths and weaknesses of citizen volunteers, see Mark Hardin, “A 
Comparison of Administrative, Citizen and Judicial Review,” (1985) 7 Children and Youth Services 
Review, 161-72. 
20
 Norway established the first Ombudsman for Children in 1981. For an overview of types of ombuds, see 
Mary A. Marshall and Linda C. Reif, “The Ombudsman: Maladministration and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution,” (1995) 34 Alberta Law Review, 215-39. 
21
 The provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick delegated responsibility for children and youth to 
their Ombuds offices as part of their general mandate or, in some cases, as a specialized function. Nova 
Mary Liston Evolving Capacities: BCRCY as a Hybrid Model of Oversight  12
bodies conform to the “classic” functions of an ombuds by resolution citizen-government 
disputes through listening, investigating, weighing facts, and providing remedies to 
resolve the dispute. But, they are also specialized ombuds with jurisdiction over a 
particular policy area or subject matter. Lastly, those offices which are informed by rights 
(e.g., civil and political, social cultural, human and collective) and international principles 
as part of their mandate can be considered “hybrid” ombuds.22 
 
Ten children’s advocacy offices currently exist in Canada, each defined by their 
provincial enabling statutes (see Table 1).
23
 As can be seen in Table 1, all are 
independent agencies, except for Alberta whose Office is contained within the Ministry 
of Children and Youth Services, and can therefore decide matters with relative freedom 
from the interference of influence of the executive branch of government.
24
 The 
hallmarks of independence vary but most of these offices have a significant degree of 
independence from the Executive, are accountable to the provincial legislative assembly, 
exercise considerable statutory powers under their enabling acts, have greater security of 
tenure under their terms of office, operational autonomy, and more secure funding since 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Scotia’s Office of the Ombudsman, for example, has a Youth and Senior Services Division. In 2011, New 
Brunswick separated the Child and Youth Advocate from the Ombudsman; previously, they were merged 
in one office. Saskatchewan, while using one statute to enable both the Ombuds and the Children’s 
Advocate, nevertheless created a stand-alone Child’s Advocate Office. 
22
 Marshall and Reif, supra note 20 at 231-34. See also Linda C. Reif, “Building Democratic Institutions: 
The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection,” 
(2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 1-69. 
23
 For further information on other provincial jurisdictions, see Robin MacLean and R. Brian Howe, “Brief 
Report on Canadian provincial children and youth advocacy offices: Highlights of functions and recent 
activities,” available on line at: http://www.cbu.ca/sites/cbu.ca/files/pdfs/crc-brief-report-canadian-
provincial-children-youth-advocacy-offices.pdf. Many people in the territory of Nunavut would also like to 
see an independent Child’s Advocate established. See “Nunavut child’s advocate needs autonomy: 
minister” at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2009/08/21/nunavut-child-advocate.html.  
24
 In this section I rely on Laverne Jacobs’ concise overview of the concept of independence of 
administrative agencies in Canadian public law. See “Independence, Impartiality and Bias” in Colleen 
Flood and Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in Context: A New Casebook (Toronto: Emond-
Montgomery, 2008), 139-66. 
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their monies come from their provincial legislatures and not the executive branch. Most 
are stand-alone agencies focussing on a single policy area created through a special 
statute, and are primarily devoted to child welfare. All of these offices hear complaints or 
issues raised by children, youth, or adults on behalf of children and youth and are charged 
with investigative powers that can be used to engage in individual and systemic 
advocacy. Individual advocacy in response to complaints or concerns remains a core 
function. All offices respond to the voice of children, but some are more active in seeking 
and engaging children’s voices. Most of the offices recommend policy changes to 
governments and engage in broad publicity and education efforts. 
 
Québec offers another variation on the ombuds model. Its Commission des droits de la 
personne et des droits de la jeunesse is a specialized administrative agency which also 
houses a tribunal and is governed by a provincial Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The 
Commission acts like a conventional human rights agency, but with a specialized child 
and youth division. Similar to the Ombuds model, the Commission reports to the 
provincial legislature. However, it also shares with Alberta a lack of independence in that 
it receives its funding from the provincial Ministry of Justice and is therefore subject to 
greater ministerial influence and control. 
 
Each of these types of ombuds approximates an inquisitorial model that enquires into 
truth by engagement in a greater responsibility for fact and policy gathering, possesses 
broad recommendatory powers, and shifts various burdens and responsibilities from the 
parties or the lawyer-advocate to the relevant independent authority. And, though each 
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provincial body differs in scope and mandate, the institutional landscape is becoming less 
of a patchwork with Alberta standing as a clear outlier.  
 
III. The Hybrid Model: B.C.’s Representative for Children and Youth  
This section will first briefly set out the most recent history leading to the creation of the 
RCYBC—a history that includes the shift from traditional adversarial processes, two 
public inquiries, a conventional child and youth advocate, a children’s commission, and 
an internal officer within the home ministry.
25
 I will then analyze the structure and 
functions of the RCYBC in terms of innovative institutional design. Lastly, the section 
considers some challenges and problems that have arisen for this new model.  
 
a. The Birth of a New Model
26
 
The creation of the first Child, Youth, and Family Advocate in 1995 resulted from a 
several key political moments within a lengthy period of institutional turmoil and 
political acrimony. First, the 1980s saw substantive change in the delivery of child 
services with the enactment of the first piece of child protection legislation since 1939
27
 
combined with deep budget cuts and reorganization of the government office devoted to 
                                                        
25
 For a thorough presentation of the historical context, see Michele McBride, “Report on Child Advocacy 
and Complaint Resolution Process,” Victoria, B.C.: Children and Youth Review, 2006. 
26
 Consistent with the genealogy set out at the beginning of this chapter, children protection in B.C. began 
with the guardianship model for orphaned or neglected children as wards of the state and delivered through 
children’s aid societies (the Infants Act, 1901). This was replaced by a model of social and child protection 
services (the Protection of Children Act, 1939) which then changed to a system of regional and community 
service delivery (Community Resources Board Act, 1974). Prior to the reforms which are the focus of this 
chapter, it morphed into an integrated system of social services, though one which was criticized for failing 
to recognize children’s rights and for not providing a child advocate role. (the Family and Child Service 
Act, 1981). McBride, supra note 25 at 5. 
27
 The Family Child Service Act (1981) was enacted in response to the Royal Commission on Family and 
Children’s Law (1974-75), but failed to incorporate many of the important recommendations of that the 
Commission made. 
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delivering child welfare programs.
28
 Economic and political turbulence resulted in a 
change of government in 1991 from the conservative Social Credit Party to the 
democratic socialist New Democratic Party. The NDP government vowed to reform the 
delivery of child welfare and protection services. They engaged in a broad public 
consultation exercise which resulted in the issue of two reports by the Ministry of Social 
Services, the first focusing on the views from non-Aboriginal communities regarding 
child welfare reform
29
 and the second focusing on Aboriginal communities in B.C
30
. 
Shortly after the second report, the province was rocked by the neglect, abuse and death 
of 5-year-old Matthew Vaudreuil in 1992 at the hands of his mother, with the media 
bolstering outrage by providing detailed reports on how the existing child protection 
services had mishandled his case. In response to these reports, the Minister of Social 
Services delivered new legislation—the Child, Family and Community Services Act 
(“CFCSA”)—which promised a value shift in service delivery based on a model of least 
intrusion to families.
31
 Though the provincial legislature passed the CFCSA in 1994, it 
did not come into force until 1996 in order to allow time for the development of new 
policies and procedures. The provincial government also created a public inquiry in 1994, 
charged with examining the circumstances leading to Matthew’s 1992 death, with the aim 
of restoring public confidence in the child protection system. This became known as the 
Gove Inquiry headed by Mr. Justice Thomas Gove, a provincial court judge.
32
  
 
                                                        
28
 From 1983 to 1988, child protection services faced substantial reductions in the staff, contracting out, 
and a reorganization that removed a variety of services from the single office—then the Ministry of Social 
Services—to separate offices managing different aspects of child welfare and protection. 
29
 “Making Changes: A Place to Start,” Victoria, B.C.: Ministry of Social Services, 1992. 
30
 “Liberating Our Children, Liberating Our Nations,” Victoria, B.C.: Ministry of Social Services, 1992. 
31
 RSBC 1996, c 46.  
32
 British Columbia, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Gove Inquiry into Child Protection in 
British Columbia, 3 vols., Victoria, B.C.: Queen’s Printer for British Columbia, 1995. 
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After eighteen months of investigation and research, Mr. Justice Gove issued his report in 
1995 recommending changes to B.C.’s child protection system as well as the creation of 
several new institutions: a new Ministry of Children and Family Development which 
consolidated several existing but then separate services under one institutional umbrella; 
the first Child, Youth and Family Advocate who would provide services for children and 
families having difficulties with the new ministry; and, a Children’s Commission to 
review child deaths and to provide oversight of the new ministry. The overall policy 
direction shifted toward removing children from their homes instead of providing 
assistance to stay together—a major break from the family preservation model that had 
inspired the CFCSA. In institutional terms, then, B.C. moved away from the family-
centred model that was commonly employed in Europe and which was premised on 
providing substantial resources for family support.
33
 The CFCSA came into force after 
the Gove Report, but it was accompanied by new regulation and practices that reflected 
the move away from the family support model, resulting in an increase in the number of 
children in government care.
34
 At the same time, the community-based providers such as 
women’s centres faced government cuts or closure, making the situation worse for those 
children in care. 
 
This institutional architecture operated until 2001 when a new Liberal government looked 
at the various agencies involved in child protection as part of a Core Services Review. In 
addition to the three agencies created in 1995 and discussed above, the Coroners Service, 
                                                        
33
 Howe, supra note 6 at 371. 
34
 From 1979 to 1993, the number of children in care decreased from 9,000 to approximately 6,000 but 
from 1994 to 1999 the numbers increased from 6,000 to 10,000. See Darcie Bennett and Lobat 
Sadrehashemi, “Broken Promises: Parents Speak about B.C.’s Child Welfare System,” (Vancouver, B.C.: 
Pivot Legal Society, 2008), 16-17. 
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provincial Ombudsman, and Public Guardian and Trustee also provided child-related 
services. In order to trim expenses and cut duplication, the government rationalized 
services by creating a new Child and Youth Officer who would replace both the 
Advocate and the Commissioner and act as the main oversight body. The Coroner would 
take on a new child death review function (one more limited than the Children’s 
Commission), while the Ombudsman would continue to monitor general fairness issues. 
At the same time, the government engaged in large-scale budget cuts as well as a shift 
towards regional provision of services in anticipation of a devolved regional governance 
model.  
 
But in 2004, individuals in the child protection system turned to the former Ombudsman, 
the former Advocate for Children, Youth and Families, and the former Children’s 
Commissioner to ask them to communicate widespread concerns to the Premier about the 
impact of budget cuts on vulnerable children and the lack of accountability in the 
Ministry. After a letter from the three former public officials to the Premier elicited no 
response, they released their letter to the public in 2005. Very shortly after this letter 
garnered significant publicity, two Aboriginal infants in the foster care program managed 
by the Ministry died and their deaths became linked with the issues raised in the letter.
35
 
Public and media scrutiny resulted in the disclosure that no internal reviews of earlier 
suspicious child deaths and the two current deaths had occurred. The new Coroner’s 
                                                        
35
 In 2005 Sherry Charlie, a 19-month-old Aboriginal girl placed in a kinship care agreement, was 
murdered while in the care of her uncle. In 2002, Chasidy Whitford, who was 2, was murdered by her 
father while the family was receiving child protection services. In both cases, the Liberal government was 
accused of sacrificing children to cost-saving because children placed in these type of kinship arrangements 
were not counted as ‘children in care’ and therefore their family providers received less government 
support compared to regular foster care providers. 
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Service did not provide the same intensive death reviews as had the earlier Children’s 
Commission and the Ministry itself did not release several internal reviews of the 
problems to the public. These failings of accountability and transparency, as well as the 
resulting public opprobrium, compelled the Minister of Children and Family 
Development to appoint the Honourable Ted Hughes, a retired judge, to engage in an 
independent review of the child protection system in 2005: the Hughes Inquiry.
 
 
 
The Hughes Inquiry examined advocacy for children and youth, oversight of the 
government’s performance in protecting and providing services in B.C., and the systems 
for reporting and review of child deaths and how much they furthered public 
accountability. At the time of the Hughes Inquiry, the Ministry had gone through nine 
ministers in ten years, including eight deputy ministers and seven directors of child 
welfare. The Ministry, Hughes concluded, had implemented a policy shift to keep 
children at home, but without the social supports and staff training due to budget cuts.
36
 
At the same time, the provincial government pulled back some functions to the centre 
from the regions while concurrently preparing the ground for the eventual devolution of 
child welfare services to the control of Aboriginal authorities. As Justice Hughes wrote, 
each of these changes on its own posed formidable challenges, but together they “created 
                                                        
36
 Judge Hughes noted that this shift undid the earlier Gove-initiated policy direction, concluding that the 
earlier shift was misguided but had its basis partly in social workers’ fears that they would be held 
responsible for children left in homes where they might be harmed. Indeed, a notorious case in Ontario 
involving the starvation death of an infant—Jordan Heikamp—resulted in a social worker being charged 
with criminal negligence for failing to intervene and protect him from his mother. The new policy direction 
prioritized child protection over family preservation. 
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a climate of instability and confusion” which ultimately frustrated the ability of the 
Ministry to protect vulnerable children and support families in crisis and need.
37
 
 
After four and a half months of research, public consultation, file review and data 
gathering, Justice Hughes submitted his final report in April 2006. The report contained 
the results of his review and set of 62 recommendations to improve child protection and 
child welfare in British Columbia. One of his key recommendations was the creation of a 
new, independent body to oversee the child welfare system: the Representative for 
Children and Youth.  
 
b. Family Resemblances 
By implementing a largely ombuds institutional model that kept some features of the 
adversarial system in the context of the oversight of child protection and welfare services, 
British Columbia proved to be an early provincial innovator.
38
 The Representative for 
Children and Youth Act, enacted in May 2006, quickly followed on the heels of the 
Hughes Report.
39
 As Table 1 shows, the RCY is a legislative officer, has the powers of a 
commissioner of inquiry, retains many of the functions of an Ombuds, and possesses the 
structural independence of a provincial auditor general.  
 
                                                        
37
 E.N. Hughes, “BC Children and Youth Review: An Independent Review of BC’s Child Protection 
System. 7 April 2006 at 4. Available at: 
http://www.mcf.gov.bc.ca/bcchildprotection/pdf/BC_Children_and_Youth_Review_Report_FINAL_April
_4.pdf.  
38
 The model for the RCY was influenced by concurrent developments in Ontario which resulted in the 
Office of the Provincial Advocate for Children and Youth (see Table 1)  
39
 Representative for Children and Youth Act, S.B.C. 2006, c.29 [RCYA]. Though passed in May 2006, the 
Act itself came into force over three phases: 1) the enabling of administrative functions in November 2006; 
2) the enabling of the advocacy and monitoring functions in March 2007; and 3) the enabling of the critical 
injury and death review and investigative functions. 
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As an officer of the provincial legislature, the RCY must provide annual reports to the 
legislature via the Select Standing Committee on Children and Youth and it receives its 
funding from the legislative assembly.
40
 To be appointed, the RCY must receive 
unanimously recommendation by a special committee of the legislative committee and 
then approval by resolution in the legislative assembly.
41
 The term of office is for five 
years and is renewable for a second-five year term only.
42
 It requires a 2/3 or more vote 
in the legislature to remove the RCY for cause or incapacity, though he or she may also 
be suspended from office with or without salary according to the same terms.
43
 
 
The office of the RCY has an almost $7 million annual budget which goes some distance 
to funding both investigative and consultative efforts. Table 1 shows that British 
Columbia, Alberta and Ontario are consistently the highest spenders on child welfare 
services. Manitoba, on the other hand, is the highest spender per capita on child welfare 
services from 1992-1999.
44
 Despite provincial fiscal restraints and federal reductions in 
transfers to the provinces, child protection and family services have seen increases and 
appear, for the moment, to attract relatively constant governmental support.
45
  
 
                                                        
40
 RCYA, s.17(1). 
41
 RCYA, s.2(1). 
42
 RCYA, s.2(3) and (4). 
43
 RCYA, s. 4(2). 
44
 Howe, supra note 6 at 374. Despite its different model, one that is about limited intervention and not 
about family services and children’s’ rights, Alberta provides the most funds. 
45
 Nevertheless, the RCY has criticized the Ministry of Children and Family Development for failing, after 
five years, to implement more than half of Justice Hughes’ 62 recommendations. See “Missed 
Opportunities in Progress on Hughes Recommendations: A Symptom of Bigger Ministry Problems,” 29 
November 2010. Available at: 
http://www.rcybc.ca/Images/PDFs/News%20Releases/Hughes%20Rpt%20NR%20Final%20.pdf.  
Mary Liston Evolving Capacities: BCRCY as a Hybrid Model of Oversight  21
Consistent with the investigative model, the Act permits the RCY to establish 
multidisciplinary teams in order to assist with reviews and investigations in child deaths 
and critical injuries.
46
 These reviews and investigations do not replace parallel criminal 
investigations, and the RCY must wait until the completion of a criminal or other 
investigation by a public body.
47
 Failure of persons to answer questions or cooperate may 
result in the RCY applying to the B.C. Supreme Court for an order to comply and, if non-
cooperation continues, the RCY can initiate contempt proceedings in court.
48
 
 
Other features of the RCY clearly parallel the practical problem-solving and investigatory 
role of an Ombuds who can choose to act formally or informally, flexibly and efficiently. 
The RCY is charged with engaging in systemic and policy advocacy
49
 and embraces 
stakeholder and public outreach as well as public education about children’s rights and 
government and parental duties. Since the statutory definition of “child” is a person under 
19 years of age, the scope of the RCY’s child stakeholder concerns is quite broad.50 
Notably, in addition to the monitoring, reviewing, and auditing functions, the RCY is 
empowered to engage in significant research efforts. 
 
The RCY possesses the discretionary initiative to investigate matters of import and can 
then submit Special Reports to the legislative assembly containing policy 
recommendations and information about governmental compliance with previous 
                                                        
46
 RCYA, s.15. 
47
 RCYA, s.13. Or, in some cases, until one year after the critical injury or death of the child—whichever 
comes earlier. 
48
 RCYA, s.14 and 14.1. 
49
 RCYA, s.6. 
50
 RCYA, s.1. “Youth” has a more limited definition: a person who between the above the age of 16 but 
under 19. 
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recommendations. The Speaker must lay these reports before the assembly and the 
standing committee as soon as possible.
51
 These investigations, however, are not solely 
directed at uncovering the ‘truth’ underlying individual cases, but try to ascertain the 
causes of systemic failures and then recommend measures that will successfully prevent 
children’s critical injuries and deaths in the future. This statutory intention expresses an 
aim to overcome the fragmentation of information and dispersal of responsibility in 
various organizations thus ensuring greater accountability. The underlying ethos is one 
directed towards problem solving, is not confrontational but consultative, and 
incorporates elements of restorative justice over forms of retributive justice.  
 
Though it does have a clear advocacy role, RCY does not engage in formal advocacy in 
courts or before tribunals, thereby eliminating the earlier lawyerly forms of advocacy. 
The RCY has no statutory power to act as legal counsel.
52
 So, while the RCY is not 
adversarial in the sense of providing or acting as legal counsel, the RCY does serve a 
more adversarial and confrontational function in the investigation review of children’s 
critical injuries and deaths—a responsibility carried over from the earlier provincial 
model and one which operates in tandem with the Coroner’s Office. Moreover, the RCY 
is tasked with preserving the individual autonomy of children in relation to family and 
state intrusion or control as legal counsel might do in dispute resolution processes. But 
the underlying child-centred approach focuses more on facilitating intervention than 
finding fault. A key function is the ensure that children no longer feel underrepresented, 
                                                        
51
 RCYA, s.20. 
52
 RCYA, s.9. Nevertheless, the RCY also does have subpoena powers such as those possessed by child 
advocates in Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan and the Yukon. 
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lack voice, and are disadvantaged by information asymmetries which adult decision-
makers control and benefit from. 
 
The appointment of Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond as the first RCY also indirectly 
incorporates aspects of the adversarial system. Turpel-Lafond is a lawyer, a legal 
academic, and is currently on leave from the Saskatchewan Provincial Court where she is 
a judge, having been appointed in 1998. She has also worked as a criminal law judge in 
youth and adult court. She has a lengthy history of involvement in projects relating to 
access to justice, judicial independence, sexually exploited children and youth, and 
children and youth with disabilities including those who suffer from foetal alcohol 
disorder. It has long been noted that in the Canadian public law order, inquisitorial 
initiatives such as commissions and public inquiries are often headed by retired or acting 
judges.
53
 While not adversarial on the surface the, the role morality and rights advocacy 
endemic to the common law adversarial system is blended with the inquisitorial model 
through the appointments process. Such a blending, however, is clearly contingent on the 
types of persons who are selected for the position as an ongoing commitment, and future 
RCYs may not always have this legal background. 
 
Close to half of the children in care in B.C. are Aboriginal, with a similar pattern existing 
across the country. In provinces with significant Aboriginal populations—including 
B.C.—children’s representatives also incorporate a particularized focus on the 
circumstances of Aboriginal children. The selection of Turpel-Lafond illustrates this 
                                                        
53
 For an excellent overview of public inquiries in Canada, see Peter Carver, “Getting the Story Out: 
Accountability and the Law of Public Inquiries,” in Colleen Flood and Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative 
Law in Context: A New Casebook (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery, 2008), 359-89. 
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point well since she is an active member of the Muskeg Lake Cree Nation in 
Saskatchewan.
54
 Her early life mirrors the experience of many of the children she 
represents—growing up in a poor home that was also afflicted by alcoholism and 
violence. Her background significantly underscores the policy shift that the RCY as in 
institution represents: the principle of family autonomy no longer is balanced equally 
against the best interests of the child. This policy shift is most clearly recognized in 
British Columbia, Ontario and New Brunswick.
55
 Each of these jurisdictions engaged in 
major reform after the tragic deaths of Aboriginal children. In jurisdictions with 
substantial Aboriginal populations, the best interests of the child will likely be balanced 
with the principle of respecting different cultural and local community practices. In B.C., 
the “best interests” framework—understood as either a legal principle or a legal test—
was subject to major debate over whether it was culturally and class specific, and 
therefore would be inappropriately applied to Aboriginal families. The outcome of these 
debates resulted in a modified best interests principle.
56
  
 
The last notable feature of the RCY attests to the role of the office in furthering 
democratic and rule of law objectives. The enabling statute contains a powerful provision 
guaranteeing a ‘right to information’. This right, which will be discussed in more detail in 
                                                        
54
 She published a book on the history of the Muskeg Lake Cree Nation that was short-listed for a 2005 
Saskatchewan Book Award. Turpel-Lafond says that she wrote the book for her children. See Mary Ellen 
Tupel-Lafond, Maskeko-sakahikanihk: 100 years for a Saskatchewan First Nation (Saskatoon: Houghton-
Boston, 2005). 
55
 For an example of this shift in the weight given to governing principles, see New Brunswick’s Family 
Services Act, SNB 1980, c F-2.2.  
56
 See, for example, s.52 of the Law and Equity Act, RSBC 1996, c 253: “52(1) In proceedings involving 
the guardianship, custody, access to or maintenance of a child the court must consider the best interests of 
the child. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply in proceedings under the Child, Family and Community Service 
Act except as provided in that Act.” The CFCSA explicitly requires the preservation of an Aboriginal 
child’s cultural identity to be part of the determination of best interests by a director of adoption or a 
provincial court. 
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the following subsection, gives the RCY the power to access any information in the 
control of a public body (other than an officer of the legislature) or director that the RCY 
herself deems necessary to exercise his or her statutory powers, functions and duties.
57
 
Importantly, the public body or director must disclose this information despite 
confidentiality or privilege claims (other than solicitor-client privilege).
58
 
 
Turpel-Lafond has used her statutory powers and mandate effectively. Her earlier calls 
for the reinstatement of the position of director for child welfare met with success in 
2011.
59
 This position was axed in 2008, but Turpel-Lafond called for a new director after 
her January 2011 inquiry into the death of 21 infants in B.C. in order to provide more 
accountability into infant deaths and ensure that standards in child welfare practices are 
complied with. In October 2011, a special committee of the legislative assembly was 
struck to consider the re-appointment of Turpel-Lafond to her second term as required by 
section 2 of the RCYA. This special committee unanimously recommended her 
reappointment, which took effect in November 2011.
60
  
 
c. Challenges to independence and judicial review’s protective potential 
As we have seen, the BCRCY combines several functions: high-level advocacy on behalf 
of children, youth and their families; sophisticated policy development and systemic 
advocacy; review and investigation of deaths and critical injuries of children and youth 
                                                        
57
 RCYA, s.10(2). 
58
 RCYA, s.10(3) and (4). The RCYA is also subject to s.51 of the provincial Evidence Act relating to 
restrictions with respect to health care evidence.  
59
 See “B.C. appoints child welfare director at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-
columbia/story/2011/03/31/bc-child-welfare-hughes.html.  
60
 For the official press release, see: http://www.leg.bc.ca/cmt/39thparl/session-
4/rfcay/media/mediaReleases/HTML/Rel-RFCAY-39-4-
BCRepForChildrenAndYouthReappointedForSecondTerm-2011-NOV-15.htm. 
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receiving government services; and, auditing, monitoring, and reporting. Not only does 
the RCY represent a polyjural model of decision-making, it also serves a 
multidisciplinary coordination function across government departments. Lastly, it 
promotes open government and public accountability in a collaborative manner with 
other public bodies.  
 
Challenges to the independence of the RCY take many forms, some obvious while others 
are more novel. Independent public institutions generally face threats to their 
independence in three ways: statutory reforms to reduce jurisdiction and powers; 
executive control of the appointments process; and budget cuts. Though financial support 
appears steady in B.C., economic downturns can easily result in substantial cuts to even 
well-regarded bodies.
61
 And, as explained above, although the appointments process for 
the RCY is more rigorous and constrained than conventional processes of appointment in 
the administrative state through the use of executive discretion, the integrity of a public 
body significantly depends on the quality of the persons leading and staffing it.  
 
Lastly, the RCY has faced a recent challenge to its powers and structural independence 
through an attempt at legislative reform. In April 2010, the provincial Liberal government 
under then Premier Gordon Campbell introduced legislation specifically aimed at not 
only restricting the ability of the RCY to access cabinet documents, but doing so 
                                                        
61
 In 2007, the RCY won the public battle to have her budget increased by an all-party finance committee: 
“Children's watchdog gets full budget hike,” 15 December 2007, Globe and Mail: 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/childrens-watchdog-gets-full-budget-hike/article137538/. 
Many motivated stakeholder groups in B.C. are committed to scrutinizing the provincial government in 
order to ensure optimal interaction with the RCY. 
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retroactively.
62
 The government asserted cabinet privilege protected this information 
while Turpel-Lafond countered that “It’s very important in my role to have a look at the 
system behind the curtain, if you like, and then very carefully report to the public to say, 
‘Here’s an issue, here’s what happened, here are some reasonable suggestions for 
improvement in the future.’…I’m in a pickle.”63 She maintained that she had access to 
cabinet documents in the past and that she, as a judge, was well aware of her duties not to 
violate privacy issues or disclose sensitive information to the public. The proposed bill 
was included in a miscellaneous package of unrelated legislation, leading to charges that 
the government was attempting reform by stealth tactics. 
 
The RCY challenged the Office of the Premier and the Ministry of Children and Family 
Development (MCFD) in court seeking to enforce her right to information and disclosure 
of documents she needed in the course of her formal audit of the then “Child in the Home 
                                                        
62
 Bill-20—2010: Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No. 3), 2010, c.21. Section 36 originally 
provided that: 
 
Section 10 of the Representative for Children and Youth Act, S.B.C. 2006, c. 29, is amended 
 
(a) by repealing subsection (1) and substituting the following: 
 
(1) In this section: 
“committee” includes a committee designated under section 12 (5) of the Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act; 
 
“officer of the Legislature” has the same meaning as in the Freedom of Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act, but does not include the representative, and 
 
(b) by adding the following subsection: 
 
(2.1) Subsection (2) does not apply with respect to information that would reveal the substance of 
deliberations of the Executive Council or any of its committees, including any advice, 
recommendations, policy considerations or draft legislation or regulations submitted or prepared for 
submission to the Executive Council or any of its committees. 
 
63
 “New legislation will ‘cripple’ B.C.’s Representative,” 30 April 2010, Globe and Mail: 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/british-columbia/new-legislation-will-cripple-bcs-
childrens-representative/article1553245/. Of the approximately 4500 children in the program at the time, 
almost 50 per cent were Aboriginal. 
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of a Relative” Program.64 The B.C. Supreme Court found that the legislature did not 
intend that the s.20 legislative remedy contained in the RCYA should preclude the RCY’s 
access to court in order to obtain a remedy for statutory breaches of s.10. In her 
judgment, Madame Justice Griffon suggested that the envisioned legislative remedy 
would be a report from the RCY containing a complaint that the Speaker would present 
to the legislative assembly and the assembly could compel persons to appear before it 
with the required documents. She further noted that this function—including determining 
solicitor-client privilege—normally lies outside the purview of a legislature and, because 
of this, might prove inadequate or ineffective. Citing the principle of the rule of law as a 
legal constraint on arbitrary state action, Madame Justice Griffin declared:  
“The rule of law is a fundamental premise of our legal and democratic 
system. It means that no one is immune from law or excluded from the 
benefit of the law. For this reason, the notion that anyone, especially 
persons holding high public office, can breach their statutory duties 
without being accountable to a court of law is a highly exceptional 
proposition.”65 
She observed that the only documents specifically excluded from the duty to disclose in 
the statute are those covered by solicitor-client, not Cabinet privilege and that this could 
not have been a legislative oversight.
66
 Lastly, if executive actors were concerned about 
the potential use of the documents by the RCY as they claimed, they too could seek either 
the prerogative remedy of prohibition in court which would constrain the RCY’s conduct 
                                                        
64
 Representative for Children and Youth v. British Columbia (Children and Family Development), 2010 
BCSC 697. 
65
 Ibid. at para. 74. 
66
 Ibid. at paras. 91-92. 
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to her statutory confines, or a declaration clarifying the meaning of the confidentiality 
provisions in the RCYA that would relate to the information the government was obliged 
to produce. Justice Griffin concluded that the RCY had a right to the information, that the 
MCFD and the Office of the Premier breached their statutory duty, and therefore the 
RCY was entitled to the remedy of mandamus ordering the production of the documents. 
Justice Griffin articulated in her judgment what Justice Hughes initially argued in his 
report: that the goal of the RCY is to restore public confidence, depoliticize child welfare 
issues, and provide a strong system of accountability. The right to information supported 
these goals. 
 
This year, the RCY and the MCFD signed an Advocacy Protocol aiming to, among many 
items, clarify their roles, commit to coordination and reciprocal respect, remove barriers 
to the RCY’s functioning, and re-affirm the RCY’s right to information in a timely 
manner.
67
 Though the protocol provides another confirmation of how dynamic this model 
of accountability has become, it also serves as a reminder of executive efforts to remove a 
powerful public law right. The next stage of development will be the mandatory five-year 
comprehensive review under section 30 of the RCYA which requires the Select Standing 
Committee on Children and Youth to determine, among other statutory matters, whether 
the Representative’s functions as described in section 6, are still required. The review 
will be completed in 2012.  
 
                                                        
67
 “Advocacy Protocol between the Ministry of Children and Family Development and the Representative 
of Children and Youth,” 4 April 2011. Available at: 
http://www.mcf.gov.bc.ca/child_protection/pdf/rcy_advocacy_protocol.pdf.  
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Bodies such as the RCY are vulnerable to reform efforts when majority governments 
disagree with actions and criticisms and can put their displeasure into legislative effect. 
When this happens, the RCY’s case stands as an example of how the adversarial legal 
system has the potential to protect a vulnerable investigative body. A broader institutional 
perspective affirms the complementary role that adversarial courts can play though 
judicial review, by acting as a necessary check on executive power and providing 
essential support for democratic and rule of law forms of accountability.  
 
V. ‘The Child is father of the Man’: International Kinship68 
While a full examination is not possible in the confines of this paper, I wish to highlight 
two salient comparative issues: 1) the problems that federal jurisdictions pose for creating 
a RCY at the national level across different countries; and, 2) the increase in the influence 
and permeability of international norms in domestic legal orders. 
 
a. The Problem with Federalism 
When levels of government are competitive and non-cooperative, federal systems 
undoubtedly complicate the implementation of children’s’ rights. They can, due to lack of 
intergovernmental consultation and coordination, create a patchwork leading to the 
arbitrary treatment of children across a national polity.
69
 Federal jurisdictions such as 
Australia and Canada do not have a Child’s Representative at the national level.70 
                                                        
68
 From William Wordsworth, “My heart leaps up when I behold” which is the epigraph to Ode: Intimation 
of Immortality. 
69
 See R. Brian Howe on the difficulties of implementing children’s rights in a federal state such as 
Canada’s where child protection, and other constitutional heads of power, rest with the provinces. Supra 
note 6. 
70
 In Canada, the federal government is responsible for child-related areas such as immigration and 
refugees, Aboriginal families and children, divorce and custody, and criminal justice. Canadian federalism 
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Australia, like Canada, has either a Commissioner or a Guardian in every State and 
Territory who represents children and youth though each of their roles differs according 
to their enabling legislation.
 71
 No federal representative yet exists, but the Australian 
Human Rights Commission has created a discussion paper proposing a national Child’s 
Commissioner
72
.  
 
By way of contrast, the United States government created a comprehensive federal 
agency devoted to children’s rights—the Children’s Bureau—in 1912. It lasted until the 
1940s when the Truman Administration reorganized aspects of the federal system and the 
Children’s Bureau lost most of its regulatory authority to larger agencies, becoming a 
small office limited to investigation and reporting.
73
 The complexities of federal-state 
relations in U.S. constitutionalism ensure that a national function will be very difficult to 
re-create due to disagreements about the proper extent of state or federal authority over 
family law.
74
  
 
In 2003, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that Canada 
establish an Ombudsman’s office at the federal level that would be responsible for 
                                                                                                                                                                     
is highly decentralized due to, a large extent, the constitutional demands of Quebec in the Canadian 
federation. 
71
 For more information on the role of Australian Commissioners for Children and Child Guardians, see 
Appendix E of the House Standing Committee on Education and Training Report on combining school and 
work: supporting successful youth transitions,” 16 November 2009. Available at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/edt/schoolandwork/report.htm. 
72
 The 2010 discussion paper is available at: 
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/human_rights/children/2010_commissioner_children.html.  
73
 For more on this history, see Kriste Lindenmeyer, A Right to Childhood: The U.S. Children's Bureau and 
Child Welfare, 1912-1946 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997). 
74
 See Anne C. Dailey, “Federalism and Families,” (1995) 143 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
1787-1888 and also Ann Laquer Estin, “Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States,” 
(2009) 18 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=113140.  
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children’s rights.75 In June 2009, Liberal MP Marc Garneau initiated a private member’s 
bill to establish a Child’s Commissioner of Canada.76 The Child’s Commissioner would 
facilitate the promotion and implementation of the Convention as well as any 
recommendations from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s review of 
Canadian practices. Due to the instability of current Canadian politics, this bill only made 
it through first reading and it is too soon after the 2011 election to know if the current 
government will resurrect this proposal.  
 
b. International Relations 
The last twenty years have seen substantial changes regarding the strength of children’s 
rights—Western societies exhibit far less ambivalence about their importance—and the 
influence of the CRC domestically. Situating the RCY in the international landscape (see 
Table 3), we can see the growing right of children to participate in formal decision-
making, to be listened to, and to be heard in various proceedings that affect their lives. 
Many jurisdictions clearly refer to the CRC in enabling legislation or incorporate 
particular principles to guide judicial interpretation, inform general standards and soft 
law, and constrain administrative action in order to conform to international norms. Even 
without incorporation in dualist legal systems, increased porosity is evident.
77
 In monist 
jurisdictions, the CRC clearly has direct influence. The prevailing ethos is child-centred 
                                                        
75
 Available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/995a15056ca61d16c1256df0003
10995/$FILE/G0344648.pdf.  
76
 Bill C-418, An Act to establish a Children’s Commissioner of Canada. Available at: 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Bill=C418&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3&V
iew=1.  
77
 For an early argument on the permeability of international norms in domestic law, see Stephen J. Toope, 
“The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Implications for Canada”, in M. Freeman (ed.), Children’s 
Rights: A Comparative Perspective (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996). 
Mary Liston Evolving Capacities: BCRCY as a Hybrid Model of Oversight  33
and child-inclusive with an emphasis on participatory rights that embody substantive 
guarantees of procedural fairness and recognize the equal moral status of children.
 
 
 
Table 3 confirms that the general trend in Western countries regarding the most effective 
institutional model has been to create independent and stand-alone bodies with a 
specialized focus on children. Systemic reform in Canada includes the recent 
strengthening of functions and independence of offices in Ontario and British Columbia 
by decoupling child advocacy from Ombuds functions. Since the 1990s, states and 
territories in Australia have created children’s commissioners. New Zealand created its 
Children’s Commissioner in 2003.  Lastly, Europe has seen the expansion of children’s 
ombuds since Norway created the first Ombudsman for Children in 1981 with the United 
Kingdom providing some of the latest developments.
78
 
 
It is not hard to conclude that the elevation of children’s moral worth has had a 
concomitant bolstering of the powers of public bodies charged with taking their views, 
rights and interests into account and facilitating their voice and will. The value shift in 
cultural norms influences the representational and advocacy capacities of these 
institutions that must embody this new perspective. As Daiva Stasiulis argues, “Rather 
than view children as ‘pre-citizens’, or as silent, invisible, passive objects of parental 
and/or state control…children are cast as full human beings, invested with agency, 
                                                        
78
 For a list of members of the European Network of Ombudspersons for Children, see 
http://www.crin.org/enoc/members/index.asp. The European Network of Ombudspersons for Children 
(ENOC) is a not-for-profit association of independent children’s rights institutions, established in Norway 
in 1997. Latin American also has many Ombuds with children’s rights units or staff dedicated to defending 
children’s rights. For an earlier comprehensive overview of international developments, see Linda C. Reif, 
“The Ombudsman for Children: Human Rights Protection and Promotion,” in The Ombudsman, Good 
Governance and the International Human Rights System (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004). 
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integrity and decision-making capacities.”79 Guarantees of procedure fairness like those 
found in Articles 3 and 12 of the CRC give real effect to the substantive moral 
commitments confirming the dignity of child citizens.  
 
Nevertheless, an eye to historical development and recent innovation serves to remind 
that procedures, representation, and decision-making frameworks can, inadvertently and 
when badly designed, make the vulnerable even more vulnerable. Though I have argued 
that a hybrid model such as the RCY is a positive development, it is also a vulnerable 
body in its own way. This case study therefore poses the recurring question of whose 
interests are being served at what costs regardless of the label or model chosen. 
 
                                                        
79
 Stasiulis, “supra note 7 at 508-09. 
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Table 1 Comparison across Canada: Structure 
 British Columbia Alberta Saskatchewan Manitoba Ontario Quebec New 
Brunswick 
Nova Scotia Newfoundland 
& Labrador 
Yukon 
Name Representative for 
Children and 
Youth 
Office of the Child 
and Youth 
Advocate 
Child’s 
Advocate Office 
Office of the 
Children’s 
Advocate 
Office of the 
Provincial 
Advocate for 
Children and 
Youth 
Commission des 
droits de la 
personne et des 
droits de la 
jeunesse 
New Brunswick 
Child and Youth 
Advocate 
Office of the 
Ombudsman 
Office of the 
Child and Youth 
Advocate 
Office of the 
Child and Youth 
Advocate 
Enabling Act  Representative 
for Children & 
Youth Act (2006) 
 Child, Youth & 
Family Enhance-
ment Act (2000) 
 Protection of 
Sexually Exploited 
Children Act 
(2000) 
 Ombudsman & 
Children’s 
Advocate Act 
(1978) 
 Child & 
Family 
Services Act 
(2003) 
 Adoption Act 
(2003) 
 Provincial 
Advocate for 
Children & 
Youth Act 
(2007) 
 Child & Family 
Services Act 
(1990) 
 Quebec 
Charter of 
Rights & 
Freedoms 
(1975) 
 Youth 
Protection Act 
(1977) 
 Child & Youth 
Advocate Act 
(2007) 
 Ombudsman 
Act (1989) 
 Child & Youth 
Advocate Act 
(2002) 
 Child & Youth 
Advocate Act 
(2010) 
Standalone   
Ministry of Children 
and Youth Services 
    
Child and youth 
division 
 
Decoupled from 
Ombudsman’s 
Office in 2011 
 
Youth and 
Senior Services 
Division 
  
Independent           
Terms of 
Office 
 5 years 
 Renewable for 
2nd 5-year term 
 5 year non-
renewable term 
 5 years 
 Renewable for 
2nd 5-year 
term 
 3 years 
 Renewable 
for 2nd 3-
year term 
 5 years 
 Renewable for 
2nd 5-year 
term 
----  Between 5 and 
10 years 
 Non-renewable 
 5 years 
 Renewable 
(unspecified) 
 6 years 
 Renewable for 
2nd 6-year 
term 
 5 years 
 Renewable for 
2nd 5-year 
term 
Accountable 
to Legislative 
Assembly 
 
Select Standing 
Committee on 
Children & Youth 
 
Ministry of Children 
and Youth Services 
 
Directly 
 
Directly 
 
Directly 
 
Commission 
reports directly 
 
Directly 
 
Through the 
Ombudsman 
 
Directly 
 
 
Directly 
Funding from 
Legislative 
Assembly 
  
Ministry of Children 
and Youth Services 
    
Ministry of 
Justice 
    
Recent 
budget 
2009-10 = 
$6,991,519 
2009-10 = 
$7,233,000 
2009-10 = 
$1,621,000 
2009-10 =  
$2,384,000 
2009-10 =  
$6,100,000 
---- 2009-10 = 
$1,679,000 
2009-10 = 
$1,658,000 
2008-09 = 
$983,400 
2009-10 = est. 
$432,000 
Specialized 
or exclusive 
focus on 
youth & 
children 
      
 
  
 
  
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Table 2 Comparison across Canada: Functions and Powers 
 British 
Columbia 
Alberta Saskatchewan Manitoba Ontario Quebec New 
Brunswick 
Nova Scotia Newfoundlan
d & Labrador 
Yukon 
Name Representative 
for Children 
and Youth 
Office of the 
Child and 
Youth 
Advocate 
Child’s 
Advocate Office 
Office of the 
Children’s 
Advocate 
Office of the 
Provincial 
Advocate for 
Children and 
Youth 
Commission 
des droits de la 
personne et 
des droits de la 
jeunesse 
New 
Brunswick 
Child and 
Youth 
Advocate 
Office of the 
Ombudsman 
Office of the 
Child and 
Youth 
Advocate 
Office of the 
Child and 
Youth 
Advocate 
Individual/case 
advocacy 
          
Systemic advocacy   
 
        
Policy advocacy/ 
recommendation 
  
 
        
Public reports   
via Minister 
        
Receive complaints           
Investigate 
complaints/ 
systemic matters 
          
Access to 
information 
 
Right to 
information 
(s.10) 
 
 
 
 
   
via Minister 
    
Right to 
information 
(s.23(1)) 
Subpoena power           
Investigate deaths           
Legal counsel   
Appoints 
        
Consultation 
processes 
 / 
Underway 
        
Child welfare           
Child and Youth 
Protection 
      ?    
Public education           
Informed by UNCRC 
principles 
   
Child and Youth 
First Principles 
 
Best interests 
      
UNCRC as direct 
influence 
  
 
   
Section 2(3) 
     
Section 
17(1)(b) 
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Table 3 International Models of Children’s Representatives80 
 British Columbia United States81 United Kingdom82 New Zealand Germany France Norway 
Model Independent, stand-
alone agency 
accountable to 
Parliament 
Panels of volunteers Independent agency 
accountable to Parliament 
Independent Crown 
agency 
National association 
of guardians ad litem 
Special judicial system Ombudsman  
(1981) 
Legal actors Representative for 
Children and Youth is a 
Legislative Officer 
Agencies recruit, train, 
manage volunteers 
(attorneys, social 
workers, citizen 
volunteers) 
Children’s Commissioners  
 England (2004) 
 Scotland (2003) 
 Wales (2000) 
 Northern Ireland (2003) 
Children’s 
Commissioner (2003) 
Voluntary 
membership 
Judge trained in child 
rights 
Appointed by the king 
Legal framework Specialized statutory 
regime blends 
inquisitorial and 
adversarial features but 
does not provide legal 
representation 
ADR model which 
interacts with the 
courts but does not 
provide legal 
representation 
 
Individual complaints 
heard in Wales & Northern 
Ireland; role in England is 
to promote rather than 
safeguard rights 
Specialized statutory 
regime blends 
inquisitorial and 
adversarial features but 
does not provide legal 
representation 
Self-regulating within 
national standards but 
limited accountability 
and no state control 
Operates within the 
inquisitorial legal model 
Operates within the 
ombudsman model with 
respect to public and 
private institutions but 
not family disputes 
Role of child Participatory, 
represented, consulted 
Represented, 
consulted 
Participatory, represented,  
consulted 
Participatory, 
represented, consulted 
Participatory, less 
represented, 
consulted 
Child has participatory 
right to express views 
directly to the judge 
Represented, consulted, 
less participatory 
Convention Art. 
3: best interests 
of the child 
Indirectly through 
systemic advocacy  
Primary Shall have regard to or 
must regard relevant 
provision in England, 
Wales, Northern Ireland; 
mandatory in Scotland 
Legislation incorporates 
principle 
Co-equal with Art. 12 Carries less weight than 
Art. 12 
Fully implements the 
CRC 
Convention Art. 
12: ensure 
procedural rights 
and enhanced 
representation 
Indirectly by ensuring 
child’s views/wishes are 
effectively & 
systematically 
represented 
Duties ranked with 
best interests taking 
priority over enhanced 
representation & 
participation 
Shall have regard to or 
must regard relevant 
provision 
Legislation incorporates 
principle  
Effectuate child’s will, 
opinion, rights to 
participation and self-
determination  
Legislation incorporates 
Art. 12 
Fully implements the 
CRC 
 
                                                        
80
 Modified and expanded table from Andy Bilson and Sue White, “Representing Children’s Views and Best Interests in Court: An International Comparison,” 
(2005) 14 Child Abuse Review, 220-239. 
81
 Note that only the United States and Somalia have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
82
 Until 2004, England’s model was an independent government agency employed guardians ad litem in conjunction with legal representation. Scotland 
employed a panel of guardians as its model where local authorities recruited and administered lists of guardians (“Safeguarders”) who did not provide legal 
representation. 
